Communists vs. Clerics: the Smolensk Choral Synagogue, the Khislavichi Rov Shtibel Synagogue and the NEP Antireligious Campaign by Hickey, Michael C.
                                                                The NEP Era: Soviet Russia 1921-1928, 2 (2008), 39-59. 
MICHAEL C. HICKEY
1
 (Bloomsburg, PA, USA) 
 
 
 
COMMUNISTS VS. CLERICS: THE SMOLENSK 
CHORAL SYNAGOGUE, THE KHISLAVICHI  
ROV SHTIBEL SYNAGOGUE AND THE  
NEP ANTIRELIGIOUS CAMPAIGN 
 
 
The early Soviet regime viewed the Jewish communities of the former 
Pale of Settlement and in the western provinces of the RSFSR as a declassed 
or petit-bourgeois element to be transformed through productive labor.
2
  
When, during the “Jewish NEP,” the Communist Party’s Jewish Section 
(Evsektsiia) turned its “Face to the Shtetl,” its primary goal was to make Jews 
productive or productivize them by transforming them into workers and 
peasants.
3
 Productivization became intertwined with the regime’s other major 
goal on the Jewish street – dismantling traditional religious culture and re-
placing it with a secularized Soviet culture and identity.
4
 In Smolensk and 
other locales where relatively large numbers of Jews lived in compact con-
centrations, Soviet policy mandated that these aims be met through indigeni-
zation (korenizatsiia), which entailed providing state services and conducting 
                                                 
1. The author wishes to thank Golfo Alexopoulos, Alexis Pogorelskin, Andrew Sloin, Susan 
Stemont, Rex A. Wade, Robert Weinberg and this journal’s anonymous referees, whose sugges-
tions greatly improved this essay, the research for which was facilitated by an IREX Short-Term 
Travel Grant (a US Department of State Title VIII Program).    
2. On Soviet “Jewish experts” and the “shtetl problem” during NEP, see Deborah Yelen, 
“‘On the Social-Economic Front’: The Polemics of Shtetl Research during the Stalin Revolu-
tion,” Science in Context, 20, no. 2 (2007): 239-301, esp. pp. 253-63.   
3. Evsektsiia leaders used the term “Jewish NEP” as a rhetorical means of tying programs 
aimed at “productivization,” such as the promotion of agricultural resettlement, vocational edu-
cation, and production cooperatives among Jews, to the Soviet state’s larger economic goals. On 
the Evsektsiia and Soviet Jewish policy during the NEP era, see Zvi Gitelman, Jewish Nationali-
ty and Soviet Politics: The Jewish Sections of the CPSU, 1917-1930 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
Univ. Press, 1972). On the project of productivization, see, for instance, Jonathan Dekel-Chen, 
Farming the Red Land: Jewish Agricultural Colonization and Local Soviet Power, 1924-1941 
(New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press, 2005).    
4. As before the revolution, commentators on Jewish affairs used the term “the Jewish street” 
to refer to the Jewish public sphere. On attempts to transform Jewish daily life, see Anna Sht-
ernshis, Soviet and Kosher: Jewish Popular Culture in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939 (Blooming-
ton: Indiana Univ. Press, 2006).  
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party agitprop campaigns in Yiddish.
5
 While the general outline of these pol-
icies was laid out decades ago in pioneering studies by scholars like Zvi 
Gitelman, recent research has been refining and revising our picture of Soviet 
Jewish life during NEP and has begun examining its local contexts.
6
    
This essay examines the NEP-era Jewish antireligious campaign in Smo-
lensk Province, and in particular attempts to transfer two buildings to secular 
use – the Smolensk Choral Synagogue and Rov Shtibel Synagogue in the sht-
etl of Khislavichi. It is based largely on evidence from the archives of the 
Evsektsiia of the Smolensk provincial party organization, the Jewish Section 
of the provincial department of public education (GubONO), and the Nation-
alities Sub-Department of the provincial soviet executive committee 
(Gubispolkom).
7
 This evidence highlights the importance of local contexts 
and cautions us against treating all conflicts over religious institutions as re-
gime-driven. It also demonstrates ways in which Jewish religious communi-
ties employed Soviet legality and mobilized public support to defend them-
selves – albeit temporarily – against the regime’s antireligious drives.8 
 
The general contours of the NEP antireligious campaign  
The NEP-era antireligious campaign was part of the larger project of cre-
ating socialist consciousness by eradicating “pernicious forces of darkness” 
                                                 
5. See David Shneer’s discussion of contemporary debates among the Soviet Jewish intelli-
gentsia over the goals of korenizatsiia (which he translates as “nativization”) in Yiddish and the 
Creation of Soviet Jewish Culture, 1918-1930 (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2004).  
6. Much current work recognizes Gitelman’s influence while challenging some of his argu-
ments (and, by implication, those of earlier scholars of Soviet Jewish life, like Solomon 
Schwarz). In some cases, these criticisms are implicit (e.g., Yuri Slezkine, The Jewish Century 
[Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 2004]), while in others it is explicit (e.g., Shneer’s Yiddish 
and the Creation of Soviet Jewish Culture; Jeffrey Veidlinger, The Moscow State Yiddish Thea-
ter: Jewish Culture on the Soviet Stage [Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 2000]). One of the 
most noteworthy recent studies of a provincial Jewish community in the early Soviet period is 
Arkadii Zel’tser, Evrei sovetskoi provintsii:  Vitebsk i mestechki, 1917-1941 (Moscow: 
ROSSPEN, 2006). 
7. Most regional Evsektsiia documents are located in the State Archive of the Recent History 
of Smolensk Oblast, hereafter GANISO, fond 3 (records of the Smolensk Party Gubkom). The 
files of the Jewish section of GubONO’s nationalities sub-department, in the GubONO fond at 
the State Archive of Smolensk Oblast, hereafter GASO, fond r-19. The records of the Jewish 
sub-department of the Gubispolkom Nationalities Otdel are in the Gubispolkom fond, GASO, 
fond r-13. I also have made use of Gubkom, Gubispolkom, and Evsektsiia documents in the for-
merly US-held Smolensk Archives material, National Archives and Record Administration Mi-
crofilm Publication T 86, “Records of the All-Union (Russian) Communist Party, Smolensk Dis-
trict, Record Group 1056,” hereafter cited as “Smolensk Archives” (with file numbers preceded 
by the German acronym for the All-Union Communist Party, “WKP ”).   
8. On the resilience of Jewish religious communities in 1921-1927, see Gitelman, Jewish Na-
tionality, p. 314, Zel’tser, Evrei sovetskoi provintsii, pp. 246-47.  
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and mobilizing the population behind regime-defined values and goals.
9
 The 
campaign’s prime target was the Orthodox Church, but it was also directed 
against all religious institutions and personnel, including those of Jews. Like 
other NEP-era campaigns, it proceeded in fits and starts and passed through 
distinct phases.
10
 During the Civil War the regime had routinely subjected 
clergy and religious institutions to “administrative repression” (arrests, con-
fiscation of property, and, of course, disenfranchisement). In 1921-1923, ad-
ministrative repression slowly began giving way to a “softer” approach that 
relied upon antireligious agitprop and politprosvet (political education).
11
 
Then, in late 1923, the regime adopted “a more liberal public policy regard-
ing religion” based upon legal toleration of religious practice and religious 
communal organizations (“obshchinas of believers”).12 The Center decreed, 
for example, that local authorities could not close synagogues or prayer hous-
es without authorization from the VTsIK.
13
 In 1924-1926, the Evsektsiia re-
stricted its antireligious campaigns to agitprop and politprosvet activities.    
When, however, the regime’s line on religion began shifting again in 
spring 1927 the Evsektsiia’s central leadership endorsed more aggressive 
administrative measures, such as the arrest and trial of melameds (teachers at 
elementary-level religious schools called khedars) and mobilization cam-
paigns to “legally” close down synagogues. In fall 1928 new directives from 
the Center formalized the return to administrative-repressive measures which 
would characterize policy during the “Stalin revolution” of 1929-1932. The 
regime, however, still maintained the façade of legality in the closing of syn-
agogues, in the name of protecting citizen’s rights.                           
                                                 
9. On the antireligious campaign as part of the project of creating a “new Soviet man,” see 
Glennys Young, Power and the Sacred in Revolutionary Russia: Religious Activists in the Vil-
lage (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State Univ. Press, 1997). See also Daniel Peris, Storm-
ing the Heavens:  The Soviet League of Militant Godless (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press, 
1998); William Husband, Godless Communists: Atheism and Society in Soviet Russia, 1917-
1932 (DeKalb: Northern Illinois Univ. Press, 2000); David L. Hoffman, Stalinist Values: The 
Cultural Norms of Soviet Modernity, 1917-1941 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press, 2003). On le-
gal restrictions against Jewish religious institutions and clergy during the NEP period, see Sht-
ernshis, Soviet and Kosher, pp. 2-3 and passim; Zvi Gitelman, A Century of Ambivalence:  The 
Jews of Russia and the Soviet Union, 1881 to the Present, 2nd, expanded ed. (Bloomington: In-
diana Univ. Press, 2001), pp. 77-82. 
10. This paragraph summarizes Zeltser, Evrei sovetskoi provintsii, pp. 230-52. 
11. In Vitebsk, for example, the Evsektsiia held public disputations and mock trials of mela-
meds and rabbis, but it also used administrative measures to requisition synagogue buildings and 
shut down Jewish religious schools.   
12. Zel’tser, Evrei sovetskoi provintsii, p. 244. 
13. As Gitelman points out (Jewish Nationality, p. 313), resolutions of the Thirteenth Party 
Congress had restricted the antireligious campaign to “agitprop and educational methods,” and in 
fall 1925 the Evsektsiia Central Bureau called for an end to the most belligerent varieties of mass 
antireligious events, such as mass demonstrations and mock trials.       
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1922-1927: “The right to study and teach Hebrew to their children in 
their own homes.” 
In a fall 1922 report on its work, the Smolensk Provincial Evsektsiia 
claimed to have carried out “a firm and decisive struggle against clericalism 
which has picked up as a result of NEP.”14 The archival record, though, pro-
vides few examples of any such struggle. The provincial Evsektsiia failed to 
conduct extensive antireligious agitprop, let alone implement repressive 
measures. It simply lacked the resources to do so: through 1926, the Smo-
lensk Evsektsiia was woefully under-staffed and under-funded and had very 
few cadres at its disposal.
15
 In early 1924 the provincial Evsektsiia bureau 
confirmed that the cadre shortage had seriously undermined its antireligious 
campaigns.
16
   
Although the Smolensk Evsektsiia was (typically) slow to comprehend the 
shift in the Center’s antireligious policy, in 1924-1926 it restricted the antire-
ligious campaign to politprosvet activities in schools and clubs, Komsomol 
agitation against the khedars, and annual agitprop drives in spring (vs. Passo-
ver) and in fall (vs. Rosh-Hashanah and Yom Kippur).
17
 In spring 1925, for 
instance, the Evsektsiia organized anti-Passover events for needle-trade 
                                                 
14. Sud”by national’nykh men’shchinstv na Smolenshchine, 1918-1938 gg.:  Dokumenty i 
materialy (Smolensk: SGPI, 1994), p. 51. The association of the revival of petty capitalism with 
the revival of rabbinical activity was characteristic of local Evsektsiia rhetoric throughout the 
NEP period.   
15. Secondary sources often present inflated figures on Jewish Communist Party membership 
in Smolensk. Merle Fainsod, and others following him, have reported that there were 732 Jews in 
the provincial Party organization in 1926. (See Fainsod, Smolensk under Soviet Rule, p. 443, cit-
ing Smolensk Archives WKP 303, 62-65; Gitelman, Jewish Nationality, p. 390, citing Smolensk 
Archives WKP 303 with no specific page reference). The 1926 Evsektsiia report cited by 
Fainsod and others, however, clearly states (four times!) “Party members, together with candi-
dates, as of January 1, 1926 [=] 333.” Smolensk Archives WKP 303: 58, 62, 63, 64; GANISO f. 
3, op. 1, d. 2614, ll. 92 ob, 103, 122, 125, 130, 133; GANISO f. 215, op. 1, d. 51, ll. 20-21.   
Most local Jewish Communists showed no interest in “Jewish work,” a fact lamented contin-
ually by the Gubkom Evsektsiia Bureau. Few had enough command of Yiddish to conduct agit-
prop in that language. The most able members of the region’s Evsektsiia were former Bundists, 
Poalei-Tsionists, and SERPists from other provinces. GANISO f. 3, op. 1, d. 2931, l. 243; 
Sud”by national’nykh men’shchinstv, p. 79; GANISO f. 3, op. 2 (Gubkom personnel records), ed. 
khr. 148, kor. 28; ed. khr. 283, kor. 52; ed. khr. 214, kor. 40; ed. khr. 156, kor. 30; GANISO f. 1 
(personnel records of the Smolensk Gubkom), op. 1, ed. khr. 2165, t. 3, d. 22504; op. 14, ed. khr. 
1943-2, d. 78. 
16. GANISO f. 3, op. 1, d. 2613, ll. 1, 2. 
17. On antireligious agitprop and shtetl antireligious events, see Shternshis, Soviet and Ko-
sher, ch. 1. The Evsektsiia had only a minor role in the most routine form of repression leveled at 
Jews, disenfranchisement. On disenfranchisement, see Golfo Alexopoulos, Stalin’s Outcasts:  
Aliens, Citizens, and the Soviet State, 1926-1936 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press, 2003) and 
“Soviet Citizenship, More or Less: Rights, Emotions, and States of Civic Belonging,” Kritika 7, 
no. 3 (2006): 487-528. 
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workers in the city of Smolensk; in fall 1925 it instructed local Komsomol 
cells and Pioneer units on how to conduct agitprop against khedars. In 1926 
the high point of the spring antireligious campaign was a March 26, 1926 
mass anti-Passover meeting at Smolensk’s “Tomskii” workers’ club.18 In fall 
1926, though, the provincial Evsektsiia failed to organize any antireligious 
activities for the Jewish high holidays.
19
   
In 1924 and 1925, the Smolensk Evsektsiia had the opportunity to mobi-
lize behind attempts to secularize the Smolensk Choral synagogue building 
and the Rov Shtibel synagogue in Khislavichi.
20
 Both attempts had been ini-
tiated “from below.” Both failed, partly because they had run against the cur-
rent of mid-NEP antireligious policy and partly because the local Evsektsiia 
still had few resources at its disposal for mass mobilization.    
 In October 1924 the city’s Jewish workers’ club asked the Smolensk 
Evsektsiia bureau to support a proposal to move the club from its current site 
– two small rooms in Zadneprov’e – into the spacious Choral Synagogue in 
Smolensk’s central district. The synagogue already was state property, since 
the Soviet government had nationalized the land and buildings of all religious 
institutions in January 1918. But under Soviet law, religious communities 
contracted with local soviets for the use of such state property, and the Smo-
lensk Jewish community of believers (obshchina) held a contract for the use 
of the Choral Synagogue building. Previous to 1924, petitions like that of the 
                                                 
18. GANISO f. 3, op. 1, d. 2613, l. 15; d. 3383, l. 6; Smolensk Archives WKP 14: 254; 
GANISO f. 3, p. 1, d. 3383, l. 13; GASO f. r-19, op.1, d. 4515, l. 259.   
19. The Evsektsiia’s only achievement on the antireligious front in fall 1926 was the creation 
of two small, short-lived Yiddish-language “Godless cells” (sections of the League of Militant 
Godless). Sud”by natsional’nykh men’shinstv, 79; GANISO f. 3, op. 1, d. 3383, l. 259; Smolensk 
Archives WKP 303: 61; GASO f. r-19, op.1, d. 4515, l. 167.      
20. The following table presents the Jewish population in the city of Smolensk, Khislavichi, 
and other locales mentioned in this essay in absolute numbers and as a percentage of total popu-
lation in 1920, 1924, and 1926. 
 
Locale     #Jews  
In 1920 
as % of total 
population  
#Jews  
in 1923 
as % of total  
population 
#Jews  
in 1926 
as % of total 
population 
Smolensk     8,782  5  11,796 11 12,887        16 
Roslavl’ 2,673 11 5,786 20 3,254        13 
Khislavichi 2,203 71 2,231 67 2,102        59 
Liubavichi 1,320 58    877 49    987        50 
Monastyrshchina.  1,944 71 1,787 77 1,350        62 
Rudnia 2,203 71 2,097 71 2,235        62 
Source: GASO f. r-13, op. 1, d. 667, ll. 6, 33, 48; GASO f. r-19, op. 1, d. 4515, ll. 18-20; 
Smolensk Archives WKP 14, l. 245; GANISO f. r- 3, op. 1, d. 2935, ll. 15, 30; L. G. Zinger, 
“Chislennost’ i geograficheskoe pazmenshchenie evreiskogo naselenie SSSR,” in Evrei v SSSR, 
materialy i issledovaniia, vypusk IV (Moscow: Izd. Pravleniia Vserossiiskogo ORT, 1929), l. 47. 
Percentages rounded to the nearest whole number. 
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Smolensk Jewish workers’ club had provided local officials with adequate 
legal justification for the secularization of church and synagogue buildings. 
In April 1924, though, the Commissariat of Justice informed the provinces 
that the VTsIK alone could authorize the dissolution of contracts made with 
religious communities.
21
 The provincial Evsektsiia, confused as to how to 
proceed, sought guidance from the Evsektsiia Central Bureau, which ex-
plained that “groups of citizens” could still petition for the transfer of syna-
gogue buildings to public use, but that provincial soviets must direct all such 
petitions to the VTsIK.
22
 In this case, the Central Bureau instructed the Smo-
lensk Evsektsiia to work out new terms under which the city’s Jewish Ob-
shchina would continue leasing the synagogue property.
23
 That appears to 
have brought the issue to an end, at least for the time-being.    
In late 1925 the Smolensk Evsektsiia received another petition regarding 
the take-over of a synagogue, this time in Khislavichi. In early November 
1925, teachers and parents of students at the shtetl’s Jewish primary school 
met to discuss deplorable conditions in that building. A section of the roof 
had collapsed and rain leaked into classrooms that were already cold (the 
building had no working furnace) and overcrowded. The situation was dan-
gerous, but the local soviet would not fund necessary repairs.
24
 One parent 
proposed that the soviet take over the new building of the Hassidic syna-
gogue Rov Shtibel, one of nine synagogues in Khislavichi, and give it to the 
school. Fifty-nine parents signed a petition to that effect which they ad-
dressed to the local sel’sovet.25   
A flurry of local mobilization followed that appears to have been initiated 
not by the Evsektsiia or the Komsomol (although party members participat-
                                                 
21. Orthodox Christian communities also used cited legal contracts for the use of church 
buildings to defend themselves from the antireligious campaign. See Glennys Young, Power and 
the Sacred, pp. 226-27. It should be noted that the Smolensk Jewish obshchina never based its 
claim to use the synagogue on the idea that it “owned” the building, although in Spring 1922 the 
obshchina did protest the local soviet’s attempt to confiscate artifacts from the local Jewish mu-
seum on the (technically erroneous) basis that the law had not nationalized movable property.  
TsDNISO f. 3, op. 1, d. 3986, l. 25. On seizures of movable church property generally, see Jona-
than W. Daley, “Storming the Last Citadel: The Bolshevik Assault on the Church in 1922,” in 
The Bolsheviks in Russian Society: The Revolution and the Civil Wars, ed. by Vladimir N. Brov-
kin (New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press, 1997), pp. 235-70.          
22. GANISO f. 3, op. 1, d. 2613, ll. 1, 2.  
23. On March 2, 1925 the provincial Agitprop Otdel and the Jewish obshchina signed an 
agreement that allowed the religious community to continue using the Choral Synagogue. GASO 
f. r-13, op. 2, d. 532, l. 293. 
24. The protocol of this November 1925 parents’ meeting is in GANISO f. 3, op. 1, d. 2935, 
l. 5. On ongoing funding issues regarding repairs to the school, GASO f. r-19, op. 1, d. 4515, ll. 
25, 122, 223 ob.; d. 4588, ll. 19, 55; d. 4748, op. 1, l. 72 ob. 
25. GANISO f. 3, op. 1, d. 2935, l. 5.   
Communists vs. Clerics . . . the NEP Antireligious Campaign                                                     45 
45 
 
ed), but by the school’s staff. On November 11 the school staff called a “citi-
zens’ meeting” that approved a resolution asking the provincial soviet “to 
take one of our nine synagogues and use it for a school . . . so that our 183 
children are not put out on the street.”26 On November 12 the school’s stu-
dents took to the streets and marched from the school to the volost’ Soviet 
carrying placards reading “Fathers, give us a place for a school!” and “Par-
ents, help us get a new school!” After meeting with volost’ soviet officials, 
the children paraded around the town center chanting “Give us a synagogue 
for a school!”27 If the local Komsomol organized this demonstration, it is not 
reflected in archival files; rather, the driving force seems to have been the 
teachers (none of whom were party or Komsomol members) and the school’s 
director, Rivkin (a non-party member), who did not enjoy good relations with 
the local party and soviet leadership.
28
 
The issue quickly divided the local Jewish community, as was obvious at a 
general assembly of the local kustar union on the evening of November 12. 
Rivkin addressed the kustar assembly, which did not follow the script of a 
well-orchestrated party event. Skeptical kustars asked why the soviet could 
not just pay to repair the school or relocate it to some other building. One 
said that they should collect money from the community to fix the existing 
school. Another added that his rabbi would help collect money for this pur-
pose. A third blamed the teachers for ruining the school in the first place. 
Several kustars, however, spoke in favor of moving the school to the Rov 
Shtibel building, which they described as “new and clean.” Over the objec-
tion of a sizable minority, the meeting decided to ask that the Gubispolkom 
give the synagogue building over for use by the primary school.
29
 A Novem-
ber 13 resolution at a meeting of local Jewish trade unionists also resolved 
that the synagogue should be turned into a school. In addition, the trade un-
ionists’ resolution provides a hint that the synagogue’s supporters already had 
begun a counter-mobilization, in that it noted that “twenty men, mostly trad-
ers” were agitating to keep the synagogue open.30   
In late November 1925 the group demanding the expropriation of Rov 
Shtibel took two more important steps towards pressing their legal claim to 
                                                 
26. GANISO f. 3, op. 1, d. 2935, l. 6.  
27. GANISO f. 3, op. 1, d. 2935, l. 4.  
28. GubONO inspection reports on Khislavichi (in GASO f. r-19, op. 1, d. 4515; d. 4558) 
give no indication that the teachers had acted in consultation or coordination with the local party 
cell, and other documents reveal a very tense relationship between the school’s director and local 
party officials. GANISO f. 3, op. 1, d. 2614, l. 49; d. 2934, l. 15; GASO f. r-495 (Prokuror Smo-
lenskoi gubernii), op. 2, d. 34, l.13.   
29. GANISO f. 3, op. 1, d. 2935, ll. 8-9. 
30. The trade unionists’ resolution alleged that the synagogue’s supporters used the building 
“as a center for their trade operations and exchanges.” GANISO f. 3, op. 1, d. 2935, l. 7.  
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the building. First, school director Rivkin convinced the sel’sovet to form a 
commission charged with examining conditions at the school. That commis-
sion’s November 25 report concluded that the current building was unsafe 
and proposed moving the school to a new location.
31
 Next, on November 27, 
a group of “Citizen Jews of Khislavichi” delivered a petition to the Gubispol-
kom requesting that it turn Rov Shtibel’s building over to the Jewish primary 
school. The “Jewish toilers” addressing the petition claimed that few of Khi-
slavichi’s 2,000 Jews were “actively religious,” while the great majority of 
citizens had “no religious feelings.” Some of the shtetl’s nine synagogues had 
fewer than a dozen members, they claimed, so “we need no more than three 
or four synagogues.” In the meantime, nearly two hundred students had to at-
tend school in a building so decrepit that it actually made them ill. “Our chil-
dren are more important than the synagogues,” the petition concluded, and so 
“it is entirely legal” to take at least one synagogue as public property “so that 
180 children can begin the [next] school year in a new school.”32   
The 1925 Khislavichi petition met the same fate as the 1924 petition re-
garding the Smolensk Choral Synagogue. On January 9, 1926 the provincial 
Evsektsiia bureau resolved that it “must help the Khislavichi population carry 
out legal measures to take the synagogue for use as a Jewish primary 
school.”33 The matter then died, and there are no further references to the cit-
izens’ petition in the regional archives. At the end of NEP the Khislavichi 
Jewish elementary school was still located in the same building and still in 
desperate need of repairs.   
Archival records on these two failed efforts to secularize synagogue build-
ings in the mid-1920s reveal little about obshchina efforts to defend religious 
rights, but it is clear that local rabbis were pressing soviet officials to uphold 
the regime’s rhetoric about “religious freedom.” In January 1927 Rabbi 
Abram Rabinovich, who identified himself both as a “citizen” and as “a Jew-
ish clerical preacher,” petitioned the Monastyrshchina volost’ executive 
committee for permission to hold four Yiddish-language public talks at the 
shtetl’s main synagogue. Rabinovich insisted that the talks would be “of a 
purely religious nature, with no discussion of any sort of any political ques-
tions.”34 In support of his request, Rabinovich referred to a recent Smolensk 
Uezd Soviet Executive Committee resolution acknowledging that Soviet law 
protected “full freedom of antireligious and religious propaganda.” He also 
                                                 
31. The commission was made up of Rivkin and two kustars, Iudson and Stiller. GANISO f. 
3, op. 1, d. 2935, l. 3.  
32. A copy of the petition – without signatures – is in GANISO f. 3, op. 1, d. 2935, l. 1.  
33. GANISO f. 3, op. 1, d. 3382, ll. 1-2; d. 3383, l. 266.  
34. Rabinovich’s four lecture topics were “Jews and Religion,” “Religion and Daily Life,” 
“Jews and the Talmud,” and “Holding Requiems for the Death of Jews.”   
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pointed out that similar lectures had been allowed in Khislavichi, Pochinok, 
Viaz’ma, and other towns in the province.35 Rabinovich’s request shows that 
Jewish clergy used Soviet law and the rhetoric of legality to their advantage 
when possible.   
Soviet officials in Monastyrshchina, unsure how to respond, turned the re-
quest over to the local Evsektsiia, which sought guidance from the provincial 
Evsektsiia bureau. The provincial bureau focused attention on one of the lec-
tures, “Religion and Daily Life,” which offered the greatest room for expres-
sion of anti-Soviet sentiment. Rabinovich’s carefully-crafted outline fre-
quently echoed Soviet rhetoric in texts designed to counter antisemitism. It 
stressed, for instance, that “The Jewish religion demands that Jews partake in 
honest labor.”36 Rabinovich also pointed out that Soviet law recognized Jews’ 
“full right to study and teach Hebrew to their children in their own homes.” 
While this and other points regarding Jewish ritual and observation of the 
Sabbath surely rankled the Evsektsiia, the rabbi kept within the confines of 
Soviet law.
37
 The Evsektsiia bureau therefore informed officials in Monastyr-
shchina that they must authorize Rabinovich’s lectures. Although the 
Gubkom Evsektsiia was compelled to revisit the matter in late 1928, in Janu-
ary 1927 this decision was entirely consonant with the relatively “softer” ap-
proach mandated by the Center.   
 
“Those who support Passover or bake matzo support the class enemy.”  
In spring 1927 the Smolensk Evsektsiia and GubONO Jewish section be-
gan to redouble their antireligious and anti-khedar campaigns in response to 
directives from the Center.
38
 Despite the expansion of the local network of 
                                                 
35. GANISO f. 3, op. 1, d. 3990, l. 76. 
36. According to Rabinovich’s outline, Judaism required that Jews aid the poor, that they live 
a “clean and hygienic” life, and that they “never lose courage.” It also provided answers for dif-
ficult questions of life; for example, he pointed out that “the Jewish religion forbids suicide.”  
Rabinovich’s theses are in GANISO f. 3, op. 1, d. 3990, ll. 77-78 ob. For useful discussions of 
the arguments made in defense of Jews and Judaism in materials produced for the party’s cam-
paigns against antisemitism, see Shternshis, Soviet and Kosher, passim. 
37. Rabinovich’s theses noted that “Jews should not smoke cigarettes on Saturdays, they 
should not eat pork . . . [and] they should strictly observe the Sabbath day.” GANISO f. 3, op. 1, 
d. 3990, ll. 77-78 ob.  
38. In the 1927-28 minority polisprosvet work plan that Glavpolitprosvet and Tsentro-
sovnatsmen sent to the provinces, the section on “Jewish work” ranked intensifying “the struggle 
against clericalism and Zionist influence” third among priority tasks. Other immediate practical 
measures stressed were increasing participation of youth in the campaign against khedars and 
yeshivas and the distribution of clearer methodological instructions on the conduct of antireli-
gious propaganda. The plan also noted the importance of strengthening “revolutionary legality in 
the Jewish sphere.” But it did not specifically discuss the prosecution of melameds, since such 
actions were outside the purview of Narkompros. GASO f. r-19, op. 1, d. 4588, ll. 47-96 ob.; for 
passages on the Jewish antireligious campaign, l. 93 ob. 
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Soviet Jewish schools and years of agitprop, Jewish children still attended 
khedars (often after completing their day at the Soviet school).
39
 Therefore in 
1927 local authorities began using “administrative-repressive” measures – ar-
rests and public trials – against melameds for the first time since 1923.40 Still, 
those efforts remained limited and poorly organized until 1928.   
In spring 1928 the regional Evsektsiia laid out more systematic plans for 
an anti-Passover, antireligious drive than it had for any previous effort in the 
antireligious campaign. In April 1928 in Smolensk, for example, the Evsek-
tsiia coordinated dozens of antireligious meetings and events designed to 
mobilize cadres and attract the broadest possible public participation.
41
 The 
campaign’s slogans all defined the struggle against religion as a class struggle 
and reflected the escalation of class-war rhetoric that marked the end of NEP. 
The lead campaign slogan, for example, stated that “The struggle against 
matzo and Passover is a class struggle, and those who support matzo and all 
those who support Passover or bake matzo support the class enemy.”42 In 
previous years antireligious activities had faded into the background between 
Passover and the fall holidays, but in 1928 the Smolensk Evsektsiia sustained 
a year-round antireligious campaign.
43
 In spring 1928 the Smolensk Evsek-
tsiia also began linking the antireligious campaign to drives to shut down lo-
cal synagogues. In response, synagogue communities mobilized their own 
supporters to an extent unprecedented since the revolution.
44
    
At the end of March 1928 the Evsektsiia revived efforts to turn the Smo-
lensk Choral Synagogue into a Jewish workers’ club. This time the provincial 
Evsektsiia bureau took a leading role in initiating and mobilizing the drive to 
                                                 
39. GASO f. r-19, op. 1, d. 4515, ll. 122, 192, 330-31.  
40. Sud”by natsional’nykh men’shinstv, 116, 122; Leninskii put’, no. 11 (Nov. 1927), pp. 54, 
57; GANISO f. 140, op. 1, d. 612, ll. 39-40 ob.   
41. There is a summary of these campaign activities in GANISO f. 3, op. 1, d. 3986, ll. 11, 
45-46, 56-57. See also GASO f. r-19, op. 1, d. 4588, l. 46.   
42. Following this class line, other slogans noted that “Not one worker, employee, peasant, or 
kustar should prepare matzo or celebrate Passover”; “Not one work day should be wasted on 
Passover and instead the days May 1-5 [during which the holiday fell that year] should be turned 
into a five day [festival] of culture”; and “Not one kustar worker should take part in the prepara-
tion of Matzo.” Campaign slogans depicted the struggle against Passover as a matter of the inter-
national class struggle. The final slogan stated that Soviet Jews must come out “Against gifts of 
matzo from the foreign bourgeoisie,” a reference to international Jewish aid organizations that 
were linked to the clerics (“Against counter-revolutionary clericalism”), as well as to the fascists 
(“Against fascism”). GANISO f. 3, op. 1, d. 3986, ll. 11, 46, 57.    
43. GANISO f. 3, op. 1, d. 3986, ll. 8, 47, 48a, 49-50; d. 3990a, l. 102; d. 3990, l. 11-12 ob., 
88. 
44. On the Smolensk synagogue and political mobilization in 1917, see Michael C. Hickey, 
“Revolution on the Jewish Street: Smolensk, 1917,” The Journal of Social History 31, no. 4 
(1998): 823-850.    
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close the synagogue.
45
 In early April 1928 (in connection with the anti-
Passover campaign), an Evsektsiia-created “initiative group” began holding 
mass meetings that approved resolutions stating that the workers’ club must 
be moved from its current location (at a Jewish school) into the Choral Syna-
gogue.
46
 These meetings were part of a well-orchestrated campaign that fea-
tured a series of articles in Smolensk’s main newspaper, Rabochii put’, at-
tacking the synagogue’s members as a “small clutch of bourgeois exploiters” 
and “lackeys of the old order.”47 The campaign also included petition drives 
meant to demonstrate mass support for taking over the synagogue.   
By the end of April, the Evsektsiia’s initiative group had hosted nine mass 
meetings and thirty-two smaller gatherings at enterprises, offices, and 
schools. At each meeting it had distributed petitions so that in all it collected 
the signatures of 2,834 civilians and 167 Red Army soldiers attesting to their 
support for turning the synagogue building into a workers’ club. The majority 
of those signing identified themselves as workers (804 signatures) or as kus-
tars (373 signatures). Employees made up the second largest group of signa-
tories (683 from state institutions as well as 222 teachers and medical staff). 
The other civilians were students (441 signatures) or people who had not 
listed their occupations.
48
 The initiative group forwarded these petitions to 
the Gubispolkom with a cover letter explaining that in Smolensk the “mass of 
Jewish workers, employees and kustars” needed a new workers’ club, “a 
strong Jewish institution . . . to satisfy their cultural needs.” The letter de-
scribed the club’s current facilities as overcrowded and pitifully inadequate, 
while the large Choral Synagogue “is literally deserted year round.” The ini-
tiative group insisted that taking over the synagogue would not violate any-
one’s religious rights, since the small congregation’s few members could at-
tend one of the city’s four other synagogues.49     
The synagogue’s board of elders and Smolensk’s Jewish obshchina re-
sponded with their own well-organized campaign. On April 24, they sent the 
Gubispolkom a letter reminding it that under Soviet law “every citizen in the 
free Soviet republic should be able to exercise the right to freedom of con-
science and religious expression.” The petitions collected by the Evsektsiia, 
the synagogue’s defenders claimed, proved only that the signatories favored 
“depriving other citizens of their rights.” While the synagogue’s leaders rec-
ognized the legality of the Evsektsiia’s antireligious propaganda (the law also 
protected the rights of those who opposed religion), they pointed out that 
                                                 
45. GASO f. r-13, op. 2, d. 532.   
46. GASO f. r-13, op. 2, d. 532, l. 24; Rabochii put’, April 7, 1928. 
47. Rabochii put, April 7, 8, 17, 1928.   
48. GASO f. r-13, op. 2, d. 532, ll. 28-280, 394-667; Smolensk Archives WKP 33: 292. 
49. GASO f. r-13, op. 2, d. 532, ll. 16-17. 
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“Soviet authorities must follow Soviet law and must not make groundless 
charges against people.” Recent antireligious propaganda, the board com-
plained, had included slanderous and baseless charges. Their letter systemati-
cally refuted assertions in Rabochii put’ that “violated the spirit of the law,” 
“willfully distorted the truth,” and slandered the synagogue board, “a legal 
association.”50 Rabochii put’ should print retractions and the Gubispolkom 
should take steps to restore “normal relations” with the synagogue because, 
as the letter concluded, “Our government recognizes the right to the free 
practice of religion and should protect the rights of believers as well as non-
believers.”51    
The synagogue board and obshchina also mounted their own petition 
drive. Distributed door to door and after religious services, their petition stat-
ed simply that “We, the undersigned, declare that the Choral Synagogue is 
necessary for our religious needs.”52 At the end of April the synagogue’s 
board presented this petition to the Gubispolkom with 150 pages of signa-
tures, listing approximately 2,500 names. Based upon information on age and 
occupation that followed each signature, it appears that the struggle over the 
Choral Synagogue had divided Smolensk’s Jewish community along genera-
tional and ideological lines (in the broadest sense), but not by occupation or 
“class.” Like the Evsektsiia, the obshchina had successfully rallied Jewish 
kustars and worker-trade unionists. The synagogue’s defenders, however, ap-
pear to have been significantly older than the advocates of the Evsektsiia-
backed plan to close the synagogue.
53
   
By collecting petitions and framing their counter-mobilization campaign 
as a defense of their legal rights, the synagogue and obshchina leadership 
employed the only means at their disposal to prevent secularization of the 
                                                 
50. The letter’s authors provided several pages of evidence against the charges made in Rab-
ochii put’. In a column on the left side of each page, they copied the claims made in specific arti-
cles in Rabochii put’, while in a column on the right labeled “the truth” they pointed out the er-
rors in these claims. GASO f. r-13, op. 2, d. 532, ll. 312-13 ob.     
51. GASO f. r-13, op. 2, d. 532, l. 313 ob.     
52. Rabochii put’ no, 93 ran a short notice entitled “Clerics organize petition,” stating that “a 
clutch of synagogue artists” led by Smolensk Rabbis Fridman and Vaisbord and aided by a co-
hort of Nepmen and torgovtsy were gathering signatures so that they could keep the Choral Syn-
agogue under their personal control. There is a clipping of this page in GASO f. r-13, op. 2, d. 
532, l. 26.   
53. The pro-synagogue petition is in GASO f. r-13, op. 2, d. 532, ll. 316-90. A random sam-
pling of 38 signatures suggests that the synagogue’s supporters indeed were “elderly,” as the 
Evsektsiia had charged:  the average age of the petitioners in the sample was 61. The sample 
does not, however, support the Evsektsiia’s characterization of the synagogue’s supporters as 
Nepmen and traders: of these 38 signatories, only 3 were torgovtsy, 1 was an employee, 21 were 
kustars, and 13 were workers who belonged to soviet trade unions. 
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Choral Synagogue building, an appeal to Soviet legality.
54
 The synagogue’s 
petition drive temporarily blunted the Evsektsiia’s campaign by demonstrat-
ing that large numbers of citizens believed that the building was critical to the 
exercise of their religious rights as protected by law. While in 1928 the polit-
ical context of the synagogue’s appeal differed from that in 1925, and while 
new administrative procedures had stacked the deck against communities of 
believers, the regime still sought to preserve the façade of legality in such 
matters. At its June 16, 1928 session, the Smolensk Gubkom Bureau dis-
cussed a report that described the campaign to close the Choral Synagogue as 
a great success.
55
 The Gubkom, though, also made note of the obshchina’s 
counter-mobilization and resolved simply that it was “expedient” to close the 
synagogue and that the Evsektsiia must find a “practical resolution to the is-
sue.”56  
On June 29, 1928 two secret memorandums from the Gubispolkom secre-
tary to the provincial Agitprop Otdel (which oversaw the Evsektsiia) laid out 
practical steps by which the Choral Synagogue building could be taken legal-
ly. A 1927 circular from the People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs 
(NKVD) allowed for the seizure of the synagogue if the obshchina had bro-
ken its contract by failing to keep the building in good repair. A special 
“technical review” of the building should be conducted to determine if the 
board’s “misconduct” had endangered the people’s property.57 This review, 
of course, was pro-forma.
58
 On July 27, 1928 the Gubispolkom declared that 
the obshchina had broken its contract by failing to maintain the synagogue 
building which therefore would be turned over to the workers’ club.   
The synagogue’s defenders appealed this decision at a special Gubispol-
kom session on July 31, 1928. They argued that the Gubispolkom resolution 
violated the legal rights of the thousands of citizens who had petitioned to 
keep the synagogue open. They claimed that the synagogue board had in fact 
maintained the building, and that the Gubispolkom therefore was violating 
their 1925 contract. The Gubispolkom resolved that the appellants had “pre-
                                                 
54. Again, it is important to note that synagogue leaders never based their protests on appeals 
to property rights and that they freely acknowledged that the state owned the synagogue build-
ing. 
55. According to this report, only twelve people attending the mass meetings in April had 
voted against shutting down the synagogue and “the great majority of workers were fully sympa-
thetic with the campaign.” There were, however, “individuals who wavered and complained in 
essence that [taking the synagogue would be] an injustice.” The full text of this report can be 
found in Smolensk Archives WKP 33: 492.      
56. The text of the Gubkom resolution is in its June 16, 1928 session protocol, in WKP 33:  
483 ob.  
57. GASO f. r-13, op. 2, d. 532, ll. 314, 315.     
58. GANISO f. 3, op. 1, d. 3990a, l. 102. 
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sented no new information on the matter” and that the July 27 decision stood. 
The synagogue was to be closed and its building used “for the cultural needs 
of the Jewish worker population of Smolensk.”59   
The obshchina leaders immediately drafted an appeal to the VTsIK and to 
Soviet President Mikhail Kalinin. “We are asking in the name of the entire 
Obshchina of Believing Jews of Smolensk,” it began, “that you defend us 
against the deprivation of our right to practice religious ceremonies.” The ap-
peal “categorically refuted” the Gubispolkom’s justifications for taking the 
synagogue: the obshchina had kept the synagogue in good repair, and the 
congregation had more than a thousand members, many of whom could not 
reasonably attend services at the city’s other Jewish prayer houses, and 
whose religious rights therefore would be violated by closing the building.
60
 
They also argued that “the [Gubispolkom] resolution not only is wrong from 
the point of law, but also is harmful to internal order” and that preserving the 
synagogue would bolster the legitimacy of Soviet power in the Jewish com-
munity.
61
 First, they explained, religion instilled people with respect for law 
and order. Second, “satisfying their religious needs not only makes people 
happy, but also makes them more satisfied.” Conversely, letting the local so-
viet violate Soviet law by depriving citizens of their rights would seem like 
“a return to pre-revolutionary times” and to the sorts of “Jewish disabilities” 
from which Soviet power had freed the Jews, and so would weaken the popu-
lation’s faith in Soviet power.62 
                                                 
59. GASO f. r-13, op. 2, d. 532, l. 306 (excerpt of July 27, 1928 GubIK protocol), l. 307-08 
(text of two drafts of resolution on closing the synagogue), l. 310 (excerpt of July 31 GubIK pro-
tocol). 
60. The letter to Kalinin, written by synagogue board chairman M. Kh. Dolgin and Rabbi A. 
Iu. Fridman, was dated August 1, 1928. The obshchina and synagogue board presented a copy of 
the letter to the GubIK on August 2, 1928. Dolgin and Fridman claimed that without the Choral 
Synagogue, Jews in the city’s upper district [the verkhnyi chast’] would have to travel to 
Zadneprov’e, the location of other synagogues, and that this would prove a great burden to a 
great many citizens. GASO f. r-13, op. 2, d. 532, ll. 304-05. These arguments directly echoed 
points made by obshchina leaders twenty-five years earlier in their effort to win the Tsarist gov-
ernment’s permission to build the Choral Synagogue. GASO f. 1, op. 7, d. 576. 
61. In 1902 the obshchina had similarly insisted that opening a new synagogue would in-
crease Jews’ devotion to the monarchical regime. GASO f. 1, op. 7, d. 576. 
62. In their letter to Kalinin, Dolgin and Fridman asked that the Soviet President “consider 
the historical dimensions of the issue.” Many of Smolensk’s Jews remembered that the Tsarist 
government in St. Petersburg had issued a prikaz demanding that the building’s cupola be re-
moved and that its façade be altered to resemble a “normal building” because “‘Outside of the 
Pale of Settlement, the Jews can only have prayer houses, not synagogues.’” The Gubispolkom 
did not understand this “historical fact,” and therefore Kalinin and the VTsIK must overrule the 
provincial soviet and defend the legal rights of Smolensk’s Jewish believers. GASO f. r-13, op. 
2, d. 532, ll. 304-05.   
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The Smolensk Gubispolkom directed its own explanation of the matter to 
the VTsIK. It based its case on three points: the great majority of Jews in the 
city had expressed support for turning the synagogue into a workers’ club; 
the obshchina had broken its contract for use of the building by allowing it to 
slide into disrepair; and four other local synagogues could accommodate the 
Choral Synagogue’s members. The Gubispolkom insisted that it had acted in 
complete accord with NKVD guidelines and that the VTsIK therefore should 
uphold its decision.
63
 
Matters were now in the hands of the VTsIK, which on August 6 informed 
the Gubispolkom that it had received the obshchina’s appeal and asked that 
all relevant materials be forwarded to Moscow for review. The Gubispolkom, 
though, went ahead and formed a commission to begin transferring control 
over the synagogue building.
64
 When, on August 10, the obshchina protested 
that the Gubispolkom could not take the building until the VTsIK had ruled 
on its appeal, a Gubispolkom deputy informed the obshchina leaders that the 
VTsIK already had rejected their appeal.
65
 Synagogue board chairman Dol-
gin, though, had arranged a meeting in Moscow with VTsIK Secretariat offi-
cial Petr Smidovich, reputedly a “soft-liner” on cultural questions who, ac-
cording to historian Terry Martin “specialized in ‘reopening’ illegally closed 
churches.”66 Whether Dolgin knew to contact Smidovich from close reading 
of official publications or had been advised to do so through networks of 
Jewish contacts is unclear. In any case, Smidovich informed Dolgin that the 
                                                 
63. The Gubispolkom noted that as many as 8,000 Jews had attended meetings that approved 
closing the synagogue, without noting that only 3,000 had signed petitions to this effect or that 
the synagogue’s supporters had gathered almost as many signatures on its counter-petition. The 
Gubispolkom claimed that only 1,600 Jews in the entire city had registered as members of the 
Obshchina of Believers, and that 1,366 of these belonged to the four other synagogues. There-
fore closing the Choral Synagogue at most posed an inconvenience to some two hundred believ-
ers. Moreover, the city’s Jewish workers had no adequate meeting space, so taking over the syn-
agogue was critical to the cultural development of the Smolensk’s toiling Jews. For these rea-
sons, the Gubispolkom explained, it had resolved to close the synagogue on July 24 and then had 
rejected the obshchina’s appeal on July 31. GASO f. r-13, op. 2, d. 532, ll. 293-94. 
64. GASO f. r-13, op. 2, d. 532, ll. 295-300 ob. At the same time, the Evsektsiia mobilized 
displays of mass support for the Gubispolkom’s decision to close the synagogue.  Rabochii put’, 
no. 181, Aug. 5, 1928; GANISO f. 3, op. 1, d. 3990a, l. 97; Sud”by natsional’nykh men’shinstv, 
pp. 136-37.   
65. The next day the Agitprop Otdel sent the obshchina formal notice of a meeting to coordi-
nate the transfer of the Choral Synagogue’s property to the workers’ club, to be held on August 
13.   
66. Terry Martin, “Interpreting New Archival Signals: Nationalities Policy and the Nature of 
the Soviet Bureaucracy,” Cahiers du Monde Russe, 40, no. 1-2 (1999): 114-15. 
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VTsIK had not yet ruled on the matter, something Dolgin pointed out to the 
Gubispolkom in a letter dated August 13, 1928.
67
       
Again, the obshchina temporarily staved off the seizure of the Choral Syn-
agogue. On August 17, 1928, the Smolensk Gubkom complained to the par-
ty’s Central Committee that the VTsIK review was impeding the transfer of 
the Choral Synagogue to the Smolensk Jewish Workers’ Club. The gambit 
could not have sat well with the VTsIK Secretariat, which rejected the July 
27 Gubispolkom resolution on the synagogue. Now it was the Smolensk 
Gubkom’s turn to send supplicants to Moscow, to the VTsIK, and to the Cen-
tral Committee. Direct appeals worked, and on August 27, 1928 the VTsIK 
Presidium reversed the decision of its Secretariat, rejected the obshchina’s 
appeal, and approved the closing of the Choral Synagogue.
68
    
The Evsektsiia’s victory was soiled, however, when it became clear that 
the Choral Synagogue building indeed was in very poor repair and that the 
cost of refurbishing the building for use as a club would be far greater than 
the Evsektsiia had anticipated.
69
 The project stalled. The city’s Jewish clergy, 
having lost the legal battle, also did what they could to spoil the Evsektsiia’s 
triumph. At services on Rosh Hashanah, Rabbi Vaisbord read a ritual kheirem 
(a ban) declaring anathema any Jew who entered the club at the former syna-
gogue. The Evsektsiia proposed that the “essential court organs” put Vais-
bord on public trial for his “bellicose clericalism.”70 There is no record, 
though, that any such trial took place. Simultaneous with those events in 
Smolensk, similar developments were unfolding in the region’s shtetls. 
In the shtetls the Evsektsiia, its ranks strengthened by young activists re-
cruited and trained in 1926-1927, began mobilizing Jewish “toiling elements” 
to demand that synagogue buildings be used for public purposes. As in Smo-
lensk, in the shtetls, synagogue supporters responded with legal appeals and 
                                                 
67. Dolgin explained Smidovich’s response in a hand-written letter to the chair of the 
Gubispolkom, dated August 13, 1928. GASO f. r-13, op. 2, d. 532, ll. 301-01 ob.   
68. At its August 23, 1928 morning session, the Smolensk Gubkom decided to protest against 
the VTsIK Secretariat’s decision and dispatched two local party bosses to Moscow, one to meet 
with members of the VTsIK Secretariat and its Presidium and another to meet with members of 
the Central Committee. That same evening, Gubkom member Bek met with members of the Sec-
retariat. The next day he met Presidium members. Smolensk Archives WKP 33: 566, 580; GAN-
ISO f. 3, op. 1, d. 3990a, l. 6; GASO f. r-13, op. 2, d. 532, l. 281 (excerpt of the August 27, 1928 
VTsIK Presidium protocol). 
69. GANISO f. 3, op. 1, d. 3990, ll. 13, 93, 94; d. 3990a, ll. 92, 94, 145; GASO f. r-13, op. 2, 
d. 532, l. 280. 
70. In his report to the Gubkom on the matter, Evsektsiia bureau secretary Iakov Lerman also 
claimed that Vaisbord’s statements had intimidated a few elderly Jews, but that most of the city’s 
Jewish kustars and workers were indignant and considered his comments scandalous. GANISO f. 
3, op. 1, d. 3990a, l. 93. 
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their own petition drives.
71
 Based on current guidelines from the Center, the 
legal process in these disputes had to play out all the way to the VTsIK be-
fore local Soviet officials could seize a synagogue building.
72
 In Khislavichi, 
the dispute over the Rov-Shtibl synagogue would drag on into early 1930. 
The 1928 drive to close Khislavichi’s Rov-Shtibl synagogue began with a 
petition from the local stocking-makers’ artel “Standart.” In mid-July 
Standart asked the Roslavl’ Uezd Soviet to give it control over the synagogue 
building which it would subdivide into an electrified workshop, a day care 
center for workers’ children, and a workers’ club. While it does not seem to 
have initiated the artel’s action, the Evsektsiia immediately threw its support 
behind the effort.
73
 In early August Standart sent the Gubispolkom petitions 
asking that the synagogue building be turned over to the artel. The local Jew-
ish obshchina quickly filed its own petitions to defend Rov Shtibel.
74
 After 
almost two months in which the matter seemed to be in limbo, the Gubispol-
kom requested further evidence of public support for taking over the syna-
gogue. In response, on October 20 the 200 members of the Standart passed a 
resolution requesting that the volost’ executive committee give it the syna-
gogue for use as a modern, electrified workshop.   
According to the artel, Rov Shtibel was Khislavichi’s smallest congrega-
tion but had the town’s best building. The interests of 200 Jewish toiling fam-
ilies, they argued, were greater than that of a few dozen believers who in any 
case had eight other synagogues at their disposal.
75 
Within a week, volost’ of-
ficials announced that they would turn the Rov Shtibel building over to the 
stocking makers. 
The synagogue board immediately appealed to the Gubispolkom, claiming 
that the volost’ soviet had broken the law in four ways. First, the obshchina 
and the local soviet had signed a legally binding agreement for the use of the 
synagogue. Second, NKVD guidelines said that the synagogue could be taken 
only if the obshchina had failed to keep the property in good repair, but that 
was not the case: the artel wanted the building because it was new and in 
good condition. Third, the law specified that the building could be taken only 
if the majority of the community approved; but again that was not the case. 
Finally, the law specified that synagogues could be taken over only for use as 
cultural institutions, such as schools or clubs; but the local authorities wanted 
                                                 
71. GANISO f. 3, op. 1, d. 3990, l. 11 ob; d. 3990a, l. 29, 30. 
72. GASO f. r-13, op. 2, d. 532, l. 10. 
73. GANISO f. 3, op. 1, d. 3990a, l. 102 (protocol of July 24 Evsektsiia bureau session); d. 
3990, ll. 51-52.   
74. GASO f. r-13, op. 2, d. 791, ll. 1, 10.   
75. The meeting’s decision was publicized in a story in the October 27, 1928 issue of Rabo-
chii put’. See also Sud”by natsional’nykh men’shchinstv, pp. 141-42; GASO f. r-13, op. 2, d. 
791, l. 7.  
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to use Rov Shtibel as a workshop. Local authorities had demonstrated a “false 
understanding of the law on freedom of conscience” and ignored the will and 
the rights of the majority of Khislavichi’s Jewish population. The Gubispol-
kom therefore must “defend the legal rights of the obshchina.” Appended to 
this appeal was a petition with 150 signatures.
76 The synagogue board’s ap-
peal forced the Gubispolkom to order the local soviet to provide still more ev-
idence that would demonstrate the legality of its resolution.    
The elaborate dance of appeals and counter-appeals, petition and counter-
petition continued through November 1928. In early November the Evsek-
tsiia organized a series of local meetings that passed resolutions and circulat-
ed petitions designed to demonstrate mass support for giving the synagogue 
to the artel.
77
 At a November 10 mass meeting, held at Rov Shtibel without 
the obshchina’s permission, an Evsektsiia speaker described the synagogue’s 
leaders as lackeys of the Tsarist regime and claimed that everyone in the sht-
etl “except for the clergy and the fanatics” approved of using the building for 
a workshop.
78
 The next day the synagogue’s board of elders complained to 
                                                 
76. GASO f. r-13, op. 2, d. 791, l. 4. In the archival file, the petition is no longer appended to 
this letter, which was stamped as received by the Gubispolkom on November 1, 1928.    
77. On November 6 the local Evsektsiia held a meeting of trade unionists which passed a 
resolution supporting the transfer of the Rov Shtibel’s building to the Standart artel. According 
to this resolution, the electrified workshop would provide incomes for 200 families and so direct-
ly benefited at least 1,000 people. The refurbished building would provide day care for the chil-
dren of women workers as well as a club, and so would improve the cultural life of Jewish toil-
ers. In comparison, Rov Shtibel served only a small group of people, who in any case had eight 
other synagogues to meet their religious needs. Appended to the resolution, which the meeting 
sent to the Gubispolkom, was a petition signed by 110 adult Jews. Only a few of the petition’s 
signatories were women.  All signatories were workers (painters, carpenters, tailors, and so on); 
and all were at least 18 years old. Most, however, were under 30 years old, which again suggests 
a generational dimension to the conflicts over synagogues. The resolution and the signed petition 
are in GASO f. r-13, op. 2, d. 791, ll. 7-10.    
78. The November 10 mass meeting at Rov Shtibel was attended by 546 people. The key lo-
cal organizers were Iudson and Stiller, two kustars who had been involved in the 1925 effort to 
turn the synagogue building over to the Jewish primary school. At the meeting provincial 
Evsektsiia bureau member A. K. Bliumberg referred to the “golden words cried to God for the 
Tsar’s health” at Khislavichi’s synagogues while the Tsar’s government would not allow the sht-
etl’s Jews to leave that Pale and cross into Smolensk Province, “three versts from Khislavichi.” 
Soviet power had freed Jews from the clerics and others who had exploited them under the Tsar 
and was transforming Jews’ lives through labor. Bliumberg argued that the stocking makers’ ar-
tel was an instrument for building this new life. The shtetl needed the electrified workshop which 
required taking property away from the exploiters and turning it over to the artel. The ORT had 
instructed the artel to open an electrified workshop, and Rov Shtibel’s building was perfectly 
suited to this need. The meeting “unanimously resolved” that, “since the artel directly benefits 
two-thirds of the population of Khislavichi,” the local administration should begin negotiations 
with the obshchina to transfer the building, for which the obshchina would be paid 500 rubles. 
GANSIO f. 3, op. 1, d. 3990, ll. 5-6; GASO f. r-13, op. 2, d. 791, l. 7.    
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the sel’sovet that the “illegal” meeting at Rov Shtibel had violated its rights, 
as did any proposal to use the synagogue as a workshop. Again, the elders 
claimed that the law and NKVD guidelines protected the synagogue unless 
the obshchina broke its contract for use of the building. The anti-synagogue 
activists, they insisted, “should be made aware of the laws on freedom of 
conscience.”79   
Ignoring the board’s protests, the sel’sovet and the volost’ soviet again 
voted to turn the synagogue over to the artel. On November 20 the synagogue 
board complained to the Gubispolkom that the volost’ administration had act-
ed illegally. It produced another petition, this time signed by 151 parishion-
ers, stating that the obshchina had upheld its legal contract for use of the syn-
agogue and that the volost’ soviet had no right to take the building. The 
Gubispolkom, careful to stay within the letter of the law, requested a full re-
port from the volost’ soviet.80 In the last week of November, the Roslavl’ 
Uezd Soviet, the provincial kustar union, the provincial Evsektsiia bureau, 
and the Standart artel all lobbied the Gubispolkom regarding the transfer of 
the synagogue in Khislavichi.
81
 
                                                 
79. GASO f. r-13, op. 2, d. 791, ll. 13-14, 15-15 ob.    
80. At its November 14, 1928 session, the sel’sovet decided to give the synagogue building to 
the artel. At a November 20, 1928 session devoted to the matter, the volost’ executive committee 
also found in favor of the artel. Its decision noted that Rov Shtibel had only seventy-eight mem-
bers and that hundreds of toilers have come out in favor of the artel, claiming that the needs of 
the majority outweighed those of the minority. It also noted that the Rov Shtibel congregants 
could, if they wished, attend different synagogues. Therefore the volost’ administration would 
request that the Gubispolkom approve transfer of the building to the artel. It is worth noting that 
in their November 20, 1928 petition, Rov Shtibel’s supporters suggested that some other syna-
gogue building might be more suitable for the workshop! GASO f. r-13, op. 2, d. 791, ll. 2, 3, 7, 
11-12 ob., 16.    
81. At its November 21, 1928 session, the Roslavl’ Uezd Soviet Executive Committee re-
solved to revoke Rov Shtibel’s contract for use of the building and to turn the property over to 
Standart; it then sent this resolution to the Gubispolkom. The next day the Smolensk Provincial 
Union of Kustars sent a memorandum to the Gubispolkom expressing its support for Standart and 
urging that the building be transferred to the artel. At its November 24 session, the Gubkom 
Evsektsiia Bureau reiterated its support for the transfer of synagogue property in Rudnia and in 
Khislavichi. The bureau, however, seems to have been confused as to the details of the Khislavi-
chi case; it resolved that Rov Shtibel should, in accord with local wishes, be turned over to the 
local Jewish elementary school! In a letter to Gubispolkom member Kolygin, the artel’s members 
noted that most of their workers were women who labored in their own homes, often for 14-16 
hours a day. Opening an electrified workshop would mean more productivity, better pay, and 
better conditions for the workers’ children. The artel’s letter systematically hit the most im-
portant buttons for the Gubispolkom in fall 1928. They were eager to “organize on the principle 
of collectivization” and insisted that the project also would improve the “cultural development” 
of the workers and their children. Their opponents, according to the letter, had not even rallied 
the entire synagogue membership: 10 of the 80 members had agreed to give up the building, as 
had 2 of 5 members of the board of elders. GASO f. r-13, op. 2, d. 791, ll. 5, 20, 22.    
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The legal fight continued through December and on into 1929. At its De-
cember 4, 1928 session the sel’sovet again declared that Standart could take 
possession of the synagogue. This time it added a new legal twist: the syna-
gogue board allegedly had violated its contract by using a portion of the 
building for storage and letting several rooms go without maintenance. On 
December 21 the Roslavl’ Uezd Soviet agreed that the synagogue had broken 
its contract which justified seizure of the building under April 1923 VTsIK 
guidelines. The synagogue board appealed again, this time directly to the 
VTsIK. On January 3, 1929 the Gubispolkom ordered local Soviet officials to 
delay action regarding the synagogue until the VTsIK issued its final decision 
on the case.
82
 It took another full year for the VTsIK to resolve the matter of 
Rov Shtibel – it ruled against the synagogue board in a laconic resolution that 
provided no explanation – by which time NEP was in the past and the 
Evsektsiia itself was being dismantled.    
 
Conclusion 
The history of attempts to secularize the synagogue properties in Smo-
lensk and Khislavichi generally fits within the framework of recent studies of 
antireligious campaigns during the NEP era. The shifts in Smolensk first to 
what might be termed a more “liberal” (or “softer”) approach to the antireli-
gious campaign in 1924 and then to a more aggressive approach in 1927-
1928, for instance, accord with the periodization presented by Arkadii Zel’-
tser in his recent study of Jews in Vitebsk.
83
 In Smolensk, though, the mani-
fest weakness of the Evsektsiia, its disorganization, its limited funding, and 
the paucity of able cadres figured more in limiting antireligious campaigns in 
1924-1926 than had been the case in Vitebsk. The 1924 and 1925 drives to 
close local synagogues had been initiated by non-party groups for reasons 
that had more to do with immediate local contexts than with the Evsektsiia’s 
project of secularizing the Jewish street, and the Smolensk Evsektsiia lacked 
the resources to bring these grass-roots efforts to fruition. The 1927-1928 
turn towards a more militant posture against clericalism came at a point when 
the Smolensk Evsektsiia had begun to overcome its cadre shortage. Even 
then, Evsektsiia mobilization campaigns had to overcome obstacles of a sur-
prising sort – the Center’s insistence, in the midst of the Cultural Revolution, 
on attention to legal guidelines and procedures.   
Smolensk’s rabbis and obshchina leaders framed their defense against the 
antireligious campaign in ways that reveal a sophisticated understanding of 
                                                 
82. GASO f. r-13, op. 2, d. 791, ll. 24, 26, 27, 29.    
83. Zel’tser, Evrei sovetskoi provintsii, pp. 230-52. 
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laws and procedures.
84
 The primary argument made by synagogue supporters 
was not that they owned the synagogue buildings (they did not), but that seiz-
ing the synagogues violated Jewish citizens’ religious rights as guaranteed 
under Soviet law, a theme raised in Rabinowich’s 1927 petition for approval 
of his lecture series. Most of their corollary arguments also depended upon 
appeals to law, e.g., that local soviets had violated VTsIK procedures. In con-
trast, the central argument made by those who wanted to seize the synagogue 
buildings – be they teachers and artel members in Khislavichi, the Jewish 
club organizers in Smolensk, or the regional Evsektsiia leadership – appealed 
to a kind of moral economy based upon numbers (what might be termed a 
“majoritarian” argument).85 The interests of the “a few dozen” believers were 
less significant, they argued, than the interests of nearly two hundred chil-
dren, hundreds of women workers, or nearly three thousand people who 
wanted a workers’ club. Fairness, the synagogue’s opponents insisted, dictat-
ed that the buildings be used for the benefit of the majority. The synagogues’ 
supporters also made reference to numbers (the numbers of people who 
signed their petitions or who attended services), but only to buttress argu-
ments rooted in the terms of Soviet law. Legal procedure, though, trumped 
arguments based upon the benefits of economic construction, workers’ cul-
tural advancement, and even class composition. The Center ultimately ap-
proved the closure of these two synagogues, but only after the ritualistic legal 
procedure had been played out. In other words, despite its well-documented 
practice of arbitrary repressive measures, the Soviet leadership considered it 
important to preserve the façade of legality, even in 1928.   
Finally, these stories of mobilization and counter-mobilization suggest that 
such disputes split communities along generational and ideological lines 
more than they did along the sorts of occupational lines that the regime used 
in ascribing class.
86
 At a fundamental level, these were disputes over access 
to resources (a common problem in the early Soviet era) and over values as 
well. Poor Jewish artisans, like the kustars at the November 12, 1925 meeting 
in Khislavichi, might well agree that their shtetl’s children needed a new 
school yet still reject the idea of closing a shule for that purpose. Close exam-
ination of local contexts, such as the conditions at the Khislavichi Jewish 
primary school, provides a key to understanding these fissures.  
                                                                                       Bloomsburg University  
                                                 
84. Again, appeals to law discussed in this paper resemble accounts of resistance by Ortho-
dox church communities analyzed in Glennys Young, Power and the Sacred, pp. 226-29. This  
awareness and use of law represents an important continuity with the pre-revolutionary relation-
ship between the local Jewish community and Tsarist state officials. 
85. I owe this observation to Golfo Alexopoulos, who commented on a draft of this article at 
the November 2007 AAASS conference in New Orleans.  
86. Here, again, there are strong parallels to Young’s findings in Power and the Sacred. 
60                                                                                        The NEP Era: Soviet Russia 1921-1928 
 
